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Marc A. Hight. Idea and Ontology. An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas. University
Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008. Pp. xiv + 278. Cloth, $58.00.
“Based on a true story: the early modern tale.” In Idea and Ontology, Marc Hight argues
that the story we have been told about early modern philosophy is false. What Hight calls
the “early modern tale” tells us that beginning with Descartes and ending with Berkeley,
metaphysics began its slide into the historical dustbin, replaced by epistemology as first
philosophy. The categories of medieval metaphysics, substance and mode, so the story
goes, could no longer serve the needs of the moderns, specifically their questions about
the nature of ideas. Ideas could not easily be categorized as either substances or modes,
and because of this difficulty, metaphysical questions were abandoned in favor of epistemological questions about the nature of representation and certainty. Hight reexamines
the early modern tradition to find the metaphysicians behind the epistemologists’ masks
supposed by the early modern tale.
Once the metaphysical questions are revealed as central to early modern philosophy,
Hight argues that Berkeley’s immaterialism, rather than ridiculous, is the final and triumphant conclusion of the metaphysical speculations of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. By showing that ideas were neither independent substances nor fully dependent
modes, Berkeley solves the metaphysical problem of ideas that had vexed Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume. Only once we have seen the metaphysical
character of early modern debates and abandoned the early modern tale can we finally
recognize, Hight argues, the importance of metaphysics for contemporary philosophy, and
thus the current relevance of Berkeley.
One could criticize Hight for failing to properly identify the tellers of this early modern tale, and for attributing too much to those he finally identifies: Yolton, Lennon, and
Watson. But surely this is a story we all have heard. Although outside the Vienna Circle it
might be hard to find anyone willing to express this sentiment explicitly, Anglo-American
philosophy in the twentieth century hardly celebrated metaphysics. To be taken seriously,
historians working on philosophers like Berkeley, a metaphysician if ever there was one,
needed to rehabilitate them. Hight argues that by turning early modern philosophers into
epistemologists, historians have done violence to those figures who were clearly metaphysicians and to debates that clearly concerned metaphysical questions.
Although I am sympathetic to Hight’s project, I did not find the strongest form of
his thesis, that these figures were primarily interested in the metaphysical status of ideas,
completely convincing. Part of the difficulty resides in Hight’s criteria for what counts as
“doing metaphysics.” For Hight, using a substance-mode ontology is enough to make one
a metaphysician, but even if this is what we might assume today, it is not at all clear that
this was true for early modern thinkers. Because he identifies metaphysics “by our lights,”
Hight manages to side-step the central issue in the early modern tale, namely, were the
early moderns abandoning metaphysics as they knew it?
The problem of the ontological status of ideas was neither virgin territory nor scorched
earth in the seventeenth century; on the contrary, it was well-tilled ground. Bracketing
metaphysical questions leading to unwelcome conclusions was a genuine strategy that
early modern philosophers adopted to avoid what they took to be scholastic quagmires or
theological-political minefields. Trying to understand the status of metaphysics in the early
modern period without this background is problematic, and without explicitly addressing
it, Hight’s case that these figures were primarily interested in metaphysical questions is
weaker than it should be.
Hight’s book persuasively shows that the early moderns were exploring the ways in which
the scholastic metaphysical categories could and could not be extended to answer questions
about the nature of ideas. While Hight sees only Berkeley as having innovated within this
history, creating a concept of “quasi-substances,” and thus as the only philosopher who
broke the chains of substance-mode ontology to finally solve “the early modern problem
of ideas,” each of the figures he covers could be seen as having extended these notions.
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However, given the trajectory of Hight’s narrative, it is not surprising that the shrift given
these figures is so short. Overarching narratives tend to distort the views of those who are,
for their purposes, minor characters. By rewriting the history of modern philosophy and
casting Berkeley as its hero, Hight goes too far, and ends up replacing one fictional narrative with another.
E r i c k a Tu c k e r
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Alexander Broadie. A History of Scottish Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2009. Pp. viii + 392. Cloth, $140.00.
Alexander Broadie is well known to those who have an interest in Scottish Philosophy. His
1990 book, The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: A New Perspective on the Enlightenment (Barnes
& Noble), attempted to show that there were two great periods in the history of Scottish
culture, the “circle of John Mair” around 1500 and the so-called “Scottish Enlightenment”
of the last half of the eighteenth century. Broadie argued that one could “trace a line of
philosophical influence from Mair’s circle to the philosophers of the Scottish enlightenment.”
The present book has a much wider scope. It is an attempt to tell the entire story of Scottish philosophy from its beginnings to the 1960s. The book has twelve chapters, including a
short Introduction (1–6) and an even shorter Conclusion (365–69). The first philosopher
discussed is John Duns Scotus. The next five chapters are called “The Fifteenth Century,”
“The Circle of John Mair,” “Humanism and After,” and “Scotland Moves into the Age of
Enlightenment,” which deals with Gershom Carmichael, George Turnbull, and Francis
Hutcheson. Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9, which constitute the bulk of the book, deal with David
Hume, Adam Smith, and The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. The nineteenth and
twentieth centuries are treated relatively briefly under the titles “The Nineteenth Century:
Ferrier to Seth” and “Realism and Idealism: Some Twentieth-century Narratives.” The book
has a fairly extensive bibliography and a very useful index.
The summaries of the different philosophical positions are lucid, balanced, and fair.
They provide very useful introductions to the thought of the philosophers discussed in the
book. Someone interested in the background of Hume and Reid and looking for a first
orientation could do a lot worse than consulting this book.
I do have a problem with the way Broadie places the accents in his history. The two
chapters on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries take up only about one sixth of the
book, yet they are among the most interesting—at least for me. They would have deserved a
more detailed treatment. The discussion of the Middle Ages and Humanism is rather long.
The same holds for the eighteenth century. The discussion of Hume in particular, whose
philosophy has received much attention of late, could have been significantly shortened.
Thomas Brown, Dugald Stewart’s successor, who is not as well known, but was a brilliant
philosophical mind, would have deserved a section of his own—or so I believe. Since he
did discuss Mair and his circle extensively in his earlier publication, this part of the book
could also have been abbreviated. Whether Duns Scotus belongs in a “history of Scottish
philosophy” I do not know. In any case, it appears that the concerns of his earlier book on
The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy exercise an undue influence on the new book.
I would have liked to hear a little more about what makes a certain philosopher a Scottish philosopher and what makes Scottish philosophy Scottish. It may well be impossible to
write a national history of philosophy in the strictest sense of the word. Philosophy, perhaps
still more than Literature and Literary Criticism, knows no national boundaries. As Lewis
White Beck once pointed out, any national history of philosophy encounters the problem
of figures whose importance transcends the limits of the philosophical discussion in any
one nation or language: “no history of English or German philosophy can be understood

